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I. INTRODUCTION 
This case note reviews Sinclair v. EPA. A case in which the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied Skidmore deference to review whether the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) exceeded congressional authority 
when the agency interpreted “disproportionate economic hardship” into the 
Renewable Fuel Standards program exemption extension review process.1 
                                                                    
*
 Aaron White, J.D. Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, Class of 2020. I would like 
to thank Professor Mehmet Konar-Steenberg for his guidance on this article. I would also 
like to thank my wife, Sarah, for her encouragement. 
1
 Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017). 
1
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This note argues that the majority opinion applied the wrong type of 
deference and examined facts of the case too narrowly. By twisting 
interpretations and focusing on insignificant words, The Tenth Circuit 
concluded that the EPA inaccurately applied their review standards.2 The 
Tenth Circuit’s decision resulted in an unnecessary circuit split.  
Part II of this note is an analysis of the surrounding doctrinal history,3 
reviewing the specific types of deference discussed in this case, legislative 
history, and relevant circuit decisions.4 Next, Part III outlines the Sinclair 
decision.5 Specifically, it provides an analysis of the court of appeal’s main 
arguments and dissenting opinion.6 Part IV compares the facts of the case 
against relevant case law to highlight tensions in the law related to the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision.7 
II. HISTORY 
A. Deference History 
In reviewing Sinclair and relevant case law, it is important to be familiar 
with the types of deference courts may grant administrative agencies. This 
section provides a brief history and summary of the cases that created the 
types of deference referred to in the Sinclair case. Specifically, this section 
explores Skidmore and Chevron deference. Skidmore deference provides 
judicial respect to an agency’s determination when that decision was made 
based on internal experience and informed judgement. Chevron deference 
applies a two-pronged test to determine if delegated powers were ambiguous 
and if the agency interpretation was reasonable. Subsequent sections discuss 
the significance of the cases and how they are applied within the context of 
the Sinclair case.8 
1.     Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 
In 1944, Jim Skidmore and six of his fellow firemen and support staff 
sued Swift & Company under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 over 
unpaid overtime wages.9 An oral employment agreement required 
                                                                    
2
 See infra Section IV.B. 
3
 See infra Part II. 
4
 See infra Part II. 
5
 See infra Part III. 
6
 See infra Section III.B–C. 
7
 See infra Part IV. 
8
 See infra Part III. 
9
 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135 (1944) (referencing 29 U.S.C. §201  
(1938)). 
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employees to stay overnight on or near company property and be available 
in the event of a fire emergency.10 The parties argued over whether the time 
spent waiting for a fire emergency was, in fact, “work time” for which the 
employees should be compensated.11 The district court denied the claim, 
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.12 
The Supreme Court held that the district court and court of appeals 
erred.13 The Court pointed out that there was no law distinguishing wait time 
from work time.14 This dispute was a question of fact that required resolution 
by interpretation of the construction of the employment agreement.15 The 
Court stated that this was a difficult task, one which Congress did not 
provide clarification for nor grant power to administrative agencies to assist 
in.16 Due to this oversight, courts were left to determine if wait time was work 
time.17 In Skidmore, the Office of Administrator18 was available and provided 
an opinion within an amicus brief.19 The Office had expertise in interpreting 
activities that could constitute compensated wait time.20 The Court 
remanded the case for further proceedings in which the Office of 
Administrator’s opinions were to be considered.21 
The Supreme Court’s decision thus created a deference test known as 
Skidmore deference. While a court is not required to defer to an agency, 
deference should be granted if the agency’s interpretation is persuasive.22 To 
determine an agency’s persuasiveness, a court must consider how thorough 
the investigation was, how consistent the interpretation has been over time, 
                                                                    
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. at 136. 
12
 Id. at 135. 
13
 Id. at 140. 
14
 Id. at 136. 
15
 Id. at 137. 
16
 Id.  
17
 Id. at 139. 
18
 Congress created the Office of Administrator, within the Wage and Hour Division of the 
Department of Labor (DOL), and imposed powers within that office to become familiar with 
industry standards and make interpretations of laws. Id. at 138. “They provide a practical 
guide to employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in its 
enforcement will seek to apply it.” Id. at 139. 
19
 Id.  
20
 Id. at 138–39. 
21
 Id. at 140. 
22
 U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). 
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how valid the argument is, the agency’s expertise in the field, and other 
persuasive factors important to the agency’s position.23  
Skidmore deference has been applied in cases where a statutory 
interpretation was made by an agency, but the interpretation did not carry 
the force of law.24 In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., the Court was 
faced with a decision as to whether the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII, 
as it related to discrimination of non-U.S. citizens in other countries, was 
persuasive.25 The Court found that the appropriate deference test to apply 
was Skidmore, as the interpretation was not part of a legislative rulemaking.26 
In Christensen v. Harris County, the Court determined whether an 
interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act published in official 
documents was persuasive.27 Again, the Court found the interpretation 
lacked the force of law and determined that Skidmore was the appropriate 
test to apply.28 In both of these cases, the Court ruled against the agency, 
finding the agency’s reasoning for their interpretation unpersuasive.29 
2. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
Following the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, the EPA was tasked 
with creating rules to allow states that had not met ambient air quality 
standards to establish a permit program “regulating ‘new or modified major 
stationary sources’ of air pollution.”30 In 1981, the EPA promulgated a rule 
within a permit requirement allowing states to “adopt a plantwide definition 
of the term ‘stationary source.’”31 The rule essentially allowed entities to 
                                                                    
23
 Id.; see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40 (stating that the Administrator’s policies and 
standards may be entitled to respect because they are based upon specialized experience and 
broader investigations). 
24
 See generally Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil 
Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
25
 Arabian Oil, 499 U.S. at 257. 
26
 Id.  
27
 Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
28
 Id.  
29
 Id.; Arabian Oil, 499 U.S. at 257. 
30
 Chevron, Inc., v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) 
(1977)). 
31
 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.18(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1983)). The regulation reads as follows: 
  (i) ‘Stationary source’ means any building, structure, facility, or installation which 
emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act. 
  (ii) ‘Building, structure, facility, or installation’ means all of the pollutant-emitting 
activities which belong to the same industrial grouping, are located on one or 
more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the control of the same 
person (or persons under common control) except the activities of any vessel.  
40 C.F.R. §§ 51.18(j)(1)(i) and (ii) (1983). 
4
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group their industrial equipment under one “bubble.”32 Any modification or 
installation within this “bubble” or grouping that did not increase the total 
emissions produced did not require additional permitting.33 
The Natural Resource Defense Council filed a timely petition to 
challenge the EPA’s adoption of the “bubble concept.”34 The D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals set aside the EPA’s regulation, stating that the Clean Air 
Act “does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a ‘stationary 
source,’ to which the permit program [applies].”35 In addition, the court of 
appeals noted that the “bubble concept” was not expressly addressed within 
the legislative history.36 Furthermore, the court of appeals emphasized that 
the purpose of the legislation should be considered with regard to any 
associated regulation.37 Congress’s intention was to reduce emissions in 
states that did not meet the ambient air quality standards.38 The court of 
appeals found that the “bubble concept” would undermine congressional 
intent by creating a loophole where operators could avoid updating their 
facilities with pollution-reducing technologies as long as their entire facilities’ 
emissions did not increase.39 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the arguments of the Natural 
Resource Defense Council and court of appeals.40 The Court pointed out 
that the legislative history related to this issue was not specific enough to 
establish “a Congressional desire.”41 Next, the Supreme Court noted that, 
given the ambiguity around this issue, the EPA must be allowed discretion 
to meet both the economic and environmental concerns within this 
regulation.42 Upon review of the public record created during the rulemaking 
process, the EPA showed a rational explanation behind the “bubble 
concept.”43 
The result of this decision created a two-pronged test “requiring courts 
to defer to interpretations of statutes made by those government agencies 
charged with enforcing them, unless such interpretations are 
                                                                    
32
 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
33
 Id.  
34
 NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom. Chevron, 467 U.S. 
837. 
35
 Id. at 723. 
36
 Id.  
37
 Id. at 725–26. 
38
 Id. at 726. 
39
 Id.  
40
 Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
41
 Id. at 862. 
42
 Id. at 863. 
43
 Id.  
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unreasonable.”44 The test is referred to as Chevron deference, or the 
Chevron two-step. A court must consider two questions when reviewing an 
agency’s statutory interpretation.45 First, or Chevron step one, the court must 
determine if Congress has discussed the exact question at issue.46 Second, or 
Chevron step two, if Congress has not spoken directly to the issue, the court 
must ask if the agency’s reasonable interpretation is a “permissible 
construction of the statute.”47  
For Chevron deference to apply, the agency must be making a statutory 
interpretation under the direction of Congress.48 For example, in Northern 
California River Watch v. Wilcox, the Ninth Circuit determined that the 
California Department of Fish and Game’s action of digging up plants was 
a violation of the Endangered Species Act.49 The issue was whether the 
statutory phrase of “areas under Federal jurisdiction” was interpreted 
correctly.50 The Ninth Circuit noted that Chevron only applies “when it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make 
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency’s interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”51 The Ninth 
Circuit determined that Congress had not delegated authority to the state of 
California to interpret “areas under Federal jurisdiction.”52 As such, 
Chevron deference was not granted.53 It was noted that some degree of 
deference should be granted to the California Department of Fish and 
Game, but the deference should be that of a reasonable interpretation, or 
Skidmore deference.54 
In City of Arlington v. FCC, the Court explained in greater detail when 
to apply Chevron. Here, the Court determined that the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) properly interpreted an ambiguous 
statutory requirement for reasonable timeframes under the 
                                                                    
44
 David Kemp, Chevron Deference: Your Guide to Understanding Two of Today’s 
SCOTUS Decisions, JUSTIA L. BLOG (May 21, 2012), 
https://lawblog.justia.com/2012/05/21/chevron-deference-your-guide-to-understanding-two-
of-todays-scotus-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/4VFF-JFVS]. 
45
 Id.  
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. 
48
 See generally City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013); N. Cal. River Watch v. 
Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2011). 
49
 Wilcox, 633 F.3d at 769. 
50
 Id.  
51
 Id. at 776 (quoting U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)). 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. at 776, 780. 
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Telecommunications Act.55 The FCC required state zoning authorities to 
make a determination of wireless siting applications “within a reasonable 
amount of time.”56 The Court determined that the decision to apply 
Chevron should turn on whether the agency’s decision was within the scope 
of its granted authority.57 The Court held that the “preconditions to 
deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress had 
unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer the 
Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency 
interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”58 
3. When Deference is Applied 
When determining which type of deference to apply, it is important to 
note the agency activity being reviewed.59 Is the agency carrying some 
delegation from Congress in which an ambiguous statute requires 
interpretation?60 Or is the agency making an interpretation without a legal 
requirement?61 Chevron deference is given when an agency interprets a law 
through promulgated rules which are enforced by law.62 Because of this high 
regard, the decision is binding unless a court determines it unreasonable.63 
For circumstances where an interpretation does not carry the force of law, 
Skidmore is the appropriate deference to give.64 
                                                                    
55
 City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013). 
56
 Id. at 294. 
57
 Id. at 297. 
58
 Id. at 307. There is a third form of deference that may be provided. Auer deference applies 
to interpretations of an agency’s ambiguous regulation. Borgen, infra note 59, at 5. This style 
of deference arose out of Auer v. Robbins, in which the DOL was challenged on an 
interpretation within its own regulation. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 456 (1997) (holding 
the Fair Labor Standards Act granted the DOL the authority to “define and delimit” the 
scope of statutory exemptions under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)). However, because the Sinclair 
case is a controversy over an EPA interpretation rising from a Congressional delegation, Auer 
deference will not apply in this analysis. 
59
 David Borgen & Jennifer Liu, Significant Legal Developments in Wage and Hour Law: 
Deference Standards, 3 (Oct. 19, 2007), https://gbdhlegal.com/wp-
content/uploads/article/NELA_Paper.2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LD5-SSCG]. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id.  
62
 Id. at 4. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Id.; see, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (Skidmore deference is 
appropriate in instances such as “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 
manuals and enforcement guidelines.”). 
7
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United States v. Mead Corp. is an important decision that provides 
direction as to when Chevron or Skidmore deference should be used.65 In 
Mead, the Supreme Court determined whether a tariff schedule was to be 
given “judicial deference.”66 Mead Corporation, the Respondent, was 
importing day planners that fell within the scope of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (HTSUS).67 Items belonging under 
subheading 4820 could have a four percent tariff or could be tariff free 
depending on the specific classification.68 In 1993, the United States 
Customs Service changed how it identified Mead’s products, which 
historically were placed under the tariff-free category and began imposing a 
four percent tariff.69 The change occurred based on the definition given to 
the planners.70 While ruling on the case, the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals did not apply deference.71 
The Supreme Court provided guidance as to when Chevron and 
Skidmore deference should be applied. A court should apply Chevron 
deference when ruling on an administrative implementation that Congress 
has delegated to an agency through a statutory provision.72 In addition, that 
authority must require that the agency promulgate a rule carrying the force 
of law, without the agency exceeding its authority in doing so.73 The Court 
noted that when the standards for Chevron deference are not met, an agency 
is not disqualified from deference.74 Skidmore deference should apply if the 
agency meets the necessary criteria.75 In Mead, the Court determined that 
                                                                    
65
 U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
66
 Id. at 221. 
67
 19 U.S.C. § 1202. U.S. Customs further identified Respondent’s products as fitting under 
HTSUS subheading 4820.10. Mead, 533 U.S. at 224. 
68
 Mead, 533 U.S. at 224. Under HTSUS subheading 4820.10, items such as account books, 
receipt books, letter pads, and diaries were subject to the four percent tariff. Id. Under 
subheading 4820.10.40, which covered a broad “other” category, items were not subject to a 
tariff. Id. at 224–25. 
69
 Id. at 225. 
70
 Id. (noting that Customs changed the classification of day planners to “‘diaries . . . bound’ 
subject to tariff under subheading 4820.10.20.”). 
71
 Id. at 225–26. 
72
 Id. at 226. 
73
 Id. at 226–27. 
74
 Id. at 234. 
75
 Id. at 227. The criteria a court should use in determining whether Skidmore deference 
applies includes the thoroughness of the investigation, the consistency of the interpretation 
over time, the validity of the argument, the agency’s expertise in the field, and the 
persuasiveness of the agency’s arguments. Id. at 228; see also id. at 234 (quoting Christensen 
v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“[C]lassification rulings are best treated like 
‘interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement 
guidelines.’ They are beyond the Chevron pale.”)).  
8
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classification of an item did not rise to the level in which Chevron deference 
should be applied.76 
Building on Mead, an important distinction was raised in Barnhart v. 
Walton.77 In Barnhart, the Court reviewed whether a definition of the word 
“disability” was applied correctly to Social Security benefits.78 Specifically, 
the Social Security Administration determined that if a physical impairment 
did not prohibit a person from gaining meaningful, successful employment 
for more than twelve months, that person did not qualify for disability 
benefits.79 The Court held that, based on Chevron, this interpretation was 
within “the Agency’s lawful interpretive authority.”80 
The Court found some rules that go through an informal rule-making 
process may still be afforded Chevron deference.81 In fact, Mead was used 
to show that Chevron was applied in previous cases to agency interpretations 
that did not go through notice-and-comment rule making.82 The Court 
determined that, for those situations, considerations for deference should 
be based on the method the agency used to interpret the statute and what is 
being asked.83 The key factors the Court considers in these situations are:  
[T]he interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise 
of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of 
the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful 
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period 
of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal 
lens through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation 
here at issue.84 
This approach seeks to answer the larger question of what power 
Congress intended to delegate to the agency.85 In this manner, the Supreme 
Court has effectively established that determining whether Chevron should 
apply requires a case-by-case analysis.86 Essentially, Barnhart sets a process 
                                                                    
76
 Id. at 238. 
77
 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). 
78
 Id. at 214. 
79
 Id. at 214–15. 
80
 Id. at 215. 
81
 Id. at 221. 
82
 Id. at 222. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. (referencing U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–34 (2001)).  
85
 William S. Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended Combination, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 249, 293 (2009). 
86
 Id. at 294. 
9
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in which “a search for thoughtful exercise of agency expertise” is 
conducted.87 
B. Legislative History 
This section will review the key components of the history surrounding 
the Renewable Fuels Standards Program at issue in the Sinclair case and the 
Department of Energy’s 2011 study. These components are important to 
understand as they help clarify what the Court of Appeals is considering. 
1.  The Renewable Fuels Standards Program Under the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 
In 2005 Congress passed, and President George W. Bush signed into 
law, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the Energy Act).88 The Energy Act was 
an amendment to the Clean Air Act (CAA), designed to promote the use of 
renewable fuels.89 The Energy Act encompassed a wide array of topics, but 
the central focus was energy production in the United States.90 Proponents 
argued that it was a necessary bill to combat the rising fuel costs in America.91 
The bill provided tax incentives and guaranteed loans for innovative 
greenhouse gas reducing technology.92 
Opponents to the Energy Act pointed out numerous flaws and 
environmentally dangerous provisions. Some felt that the Energy Act was 
nothing more than unnecessary subsidies granted to the nuclear and oil 
industries.93 Specifically, the Energy Act “include[d] an estimated $85 billion 
worth of subsidies and tax breaks for most forms of energy . . . .”94 In 
                                                                    
87
 Id. at 294 n.248 (summarizing Richard W. Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury: 
Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 
22 (2004)). 
88
 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 15801 (2005)); see also Energy Policy Act of 2005, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Energy_Policy_Act_of_2005 [https://perma.cc/K986-WGLF] 
[hereinafter BALLOTPEDIA]. 
89
 See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2009); see also 40 C.F.R. § 80.1429 (2014). 
90
 Summary of the Energy Policy Act, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-energy-policy-act 
[https://perma.cc/36DG-7J4F]. 
91
 Energy Policy Act of 2005, supra note 88; see also BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 88.  
92
 Summary of the Energy Policy Act, supra note 90. 
93
 Michael Grunwald & Juliet Eilperin, Energy Bill Raises Fears About Pollution, Fraud, 
WASH. POST (Jul. 30, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/07/29/AR2005072901128.html?noredirect=on 
[https://perma.cc/BT8M-4GWZ]. 
94
 Id.  
10
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addition, opponents felt many provisions weakened environmental 
protections. For example, the Energy Act undermined the Safe Drinking 
Water Act of 1974 by exempting fracking operations from regulation.95 
Specifically, the Energy Act removed the EPA’s obligation from regulating 
the oil and gas operations associated with fracking.96 For the purposes of this 
case note, the provisions of the Energy Act that will be reviewed are those 
associated with the Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) program.97  
The RFS program places a requirement on oil refineries to produce 
fuels from “renewable biomass” or to purchase credits from other 
refineries.98 The renewable fuel produced is categorized under Renewable 
Identification Numbers (RINs).99 To be in good standing, a refinery must 
obtain the requisite number of RINs by the end of a year.100 In addition, a 
time scale was set in place for clear goals that refineries were meant to hit by 
certain dates.101 Congress delegated authority to the EPA to promulgate rules 
to ensure that the goals of the program were achieved.102 
Congress recognized that there could be unintended consequences to 
small refineries with this new program. As such, a provision within the 
amendment provided small refineries experiencing “disproportionate 
economic hardship” an exemption from the program.103 This exemption was 
set in place for all small refineries and ended in 2011.104  
The Department of Energy (DOE) was charged with conducting a 
study to determine if the regulations placed a “disproportionate economic 
hardship” on small refineries.105 For those refineries found to suffer a 
“disproportionate economic hardship,” an additional two-year exemption 
would be granted.106 The study concluded that “[i]f certain small refineries 
must purchase RINs that are far more expensive than those that may be 
                                                                    
95
 Renee Lewis Kosnik, The Oil and Gas Industry’s Exclusions and Exemptions to Major 
Environmental Statutes, EARTH WORKS & OIL AND GAS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 1, 8 
(2007), https://www.minnesotaikes.org/resolutions/2016-08Background-NEPA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3W3J-AM7R]. 
96
 Id.  
97
 See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2009). 
98
 Id. at § 7545(o)(2). 
99
 Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 989 (10th Cir. 2017) (“A RIN is created 
when a producer makes a gallon of renewable fuel, blends the renewable fuel with petroleum-
based fuel, and sells the resulting product domestically.”). 
100
 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(5). 
101
 Id. at § 7545(o)(2)(B). 
102
 Id. at § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i). 
103
 Id. at § 7545(o)(9). 
104
 Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(A)(i). 
105
 Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I). 
106
 Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II). 
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generated through blending, . . . [a] disproportionate economic hardship for 
those effected entities” will occur.107  
Additionally, Congress assigned the EPA the task of overseeing an 
additional exemption program.108 Under the Act, refineries that met the 
definition of a small refinery could petition the EPA for an exemption.109 
Congress provided that if a small refinery suffered a “disproportionate 
economic hardship” because of the RFS program, the refinery could 
petition the EPA for an exemption extension.110 Congress specifically 
directed the EPA to “consult with DOE and consider the findings of DOE’s 
study in addition to ‘other economic factors.’”111 The statute does not 
provide a definition for “disproportionate economic hardship.”112 
In 2010 the EPA promulgated rules through a formal rule-making 
process for the RFS program.113 Within these rules, the EPA codified the 
process by which a small refinery may apply for an exemption extension 
petition and created a timeline for the EPA to rule on that petition.114 Within 
the preamble of the Federal Register, where the final rule was published, 
the EPA discussed how the agency would approach factors that could create 
a “disproportional economic impact” to small refineries.115 The EPA noted 
that the agency would follow the direction provided by the results of the 
DOE’s 2011 study.116 
                                                                    
107
 Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 989 n.2 (10th Cir. 2017). 
108
 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B). 
109
 Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii). “The term ‘small refinery’ means a refinery for which the average 
aggregate daily crude oil throughput for a calendar year (as determined by dividing the 
aggregate throughput for the calendar year by the number of days in the calendar year) does 
not exceed 75,000 barrels.” Id. at § 7545(o)(1)(K). 
110
 Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(B). 
111
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 989; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii); S. REP. NO. 111-45, at 
109 (2009).  
112
 See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(1). 
113
 Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670 (Mar. 26, 2010) (codified at 
40 C.F.R. pt. 80); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (delegating authority to the EPA to 
promulgate rules to regulate the RFS program). 
114
 40 C.F.R. 80.1441(e)(2) (2014). 
115
 Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 75 Fed. Reg. at 14,736. 
116
 Id. At the time the final rule had been codified, the DOE had yet to complete the 2011 
study. Id. The EPA noted the small refineries’ concerns about the conclusions of the DOE’s 
first study, which was completed in 2005. Id. The agency made assurances that once the 
DOE’s new study was completed, the EPA would revisit the petition standards and that any 
decision would be consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii). Id. 
12
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2. The Department of Energy’s 2011 Study 
The DOE’s 2011 study outlined the impact the new RFS regulations 
had on small refineries and established a system of factors to review when 
determining whether a refinery qualified for further exemptions.117 At the 
conclusion of that study, fifty-nine small refineries in the United States were 
deemed to face continual “disproportionate economic hardship” if not 
exempted from the regulation.118 Those refineries were given an exemption 
extension through 2013.119 The study determined that two factors should be 
analyzed for each refinery: “a high cost of compliance relative to the industry 
average, and an effect sufficient to cause a significant impairment of the 
refinery operations.”120 These factors are referred to, respectively, as an 
impacts index and a viability index. To qualify for an exemption, a refinery 
needs to score higher than a one on both indices.121 
The impacts index (sometimes referred to as the disproportionate 
impacts index) is assessed by examining eight components.122 The original 
scoring for this index was either a zero (no impact) or a ten (high impact).123 
However, the DOE added an intermediate score (five) in 2013.124  
The viability index measures three components. “[First,] whether 
compliance costs would eliminate efficiency gains to the refinery; [second] 
whether individual special events would adversely affect the refinery; and 
[third] whether compliance costs would likely lead to a shutdown of the 
refinery.”125 The scores are again either a zero, five, or ten. The scores are 
tallied and divided by six to get the viability score.126 If a score is greater than 
one, then a viability hardship is determined to exist.127  
                                                                    
117
 Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 993–94 (10th Cir. 2017). 
118
 Id. at 990. 
119
 Id.  
120
 Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
121
 Hermes, 787 F.3d at 573.  
122
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1000 (Lucero, J., dissenting). The eight components are percentage 
of diesel production, access to capital/credit, availability of other cash flows, local market, 
state regulation, relative refining margin, blending capability, and niche market. Id.  
123
 Hermes, 787 F.3d at 576. 
124
 Id. “DOE added an ‘intermediate score[ ]’ in order to ‘more accurately characterize the 
impacts of compliance costs . . . on a refinery.’” Id. “The intermediate score ‘allows for more 
nuanced and accurate characterization of the’ refinery’s situation.” Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 792 
F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2015). 
125
 Id. at 575–76. 
126
 Id. at 576. 
127
 Id. 
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C. Case Law History 
1. Hermes Consolidated v. EPA 
One of the more recent cases that evaluates the economic hardship 
exemption is Hermes Consolidated v. EPA.128 Hermes Consolidated, doing 
business as Wyoming Refining Company (WRC), is a small refining 
company operating in Newcastle, Wyoming.129 Due to the refinery’s 
production size, it was eligible for the small refinery exemption and the two-
year DOE exemption extension.130 In 2013, WRC petitioned the EPA to 
extend the hardship exemption, claiming “financial stress caused by the 
skyrocketing price of RINs.”131 The EPA denied WRC’s request.132 WRC 
challenged the EPA’s finding, claiming that the interpretation of 
“disproportionate economic hardship” contradicted the plain language of 
the statute and that the evaluation method adopted was arbitrary and 
capricious.133 
In determining whether WRC qualified for the exemption extension, 
the EPA consulted with the DOE.134 The EPA provided the DOE with 
WRC’s data, which was then analyzed pursuant to the methodology 
established in the DOE’s 2011 study.135 “WRC scored higher than 1 on the 
disproportionate impacts index but less than 1 on the viability index. 
Because the viability index fell below the threshold of 1, and a value greater 
than 1 in both indices is required, the DOE declined to recommend 
[extension of] WRC’s exemption.”136 The EPA then reviewed the data and 
came to the same conclusion, “finding . . . no disproportionate economic 
hardship.”137 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals used Chevron deference to 
determine whether the EPA interpreted “disproportionate economic 
hardship.”138 WRC argued that considering a viability index within the 
framework of “disproportionate economic hardship” contradicted the plain 
                                                                    
128
 See Hermes, 787 F.3d 568. 
129
 Id. at 571. 
130
 Id. at 573. 
131
 Id. at 574. 
132
 Id. 
133
 Id. at 574–76. 
134
 Id. at 574 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) (2009) (Congress directed the EPA to 
consult with the DOE in evaluating hardship petitions.)). 
135
 Id. at 574. 
136
 Id.  
137
 Id. 
138
 Id.  
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language of the statute.139 The D.C. Circuit Court pointed out that Congress 
did not provide a precise definition but rather gave the EPA general 
guidance to evaluate exemption extensions.140 Specifically, the EPA was 
required to consult with the DOE and “consider the findings of the [2011 
study] and other economic factors.”141 As Congress did not provide more 
explicit instructions, Chevron step one was met, and the D.C. Circuit Court 
moved on to Chevron step two.142 
The EPA’s use of the DOE’s 2011 study methodology as it related to 
the viability index was determined to be a permissible construction of the 
statute under Chevron step two.143 The EPA’s rationale for why 
“disproportionate economic hardship” modeled the 2011 study was 
because “[t]he basis for any grant of an exemption extension by EPA in 
response to an individual petition is the same as the basis of evaluation in 
the [2011 study] . . . .”144 As both steps of the Chevron two-step were satisfied, 
deference and discretion of the exemption extension reviewal processes lay 
with the EPA.145 
WRC also challenged the review process, stating that the evaluation 
change, which incorporated an intermediate score within the tested indices, 
was effectively a rule change and, without explanation, that the rule was 
arbitrary and capricious.146 The D.C. Circuit disagreed because the EPA had 
addressed the change. Specifically, the EPA noted that “the addition of an 
intermediate score to the efficiency-gains metric allows for more nuanced 
and accurate characterization of the impact of compliance costs.”147 
Furthermore, the 2011 study explained that the original score was meant to 
protect refineries from “immediate shutdown” and that it was expected for 
exemption holders to take steps to reduce the program impacts in the 
future.148 Specifically, the study pointed out that refineries could reduce the 
initial score, so the adoption of an intermediate scoring system was in line 
with the findings of the DOE’s study.149 The D.C. Circuit held that, because 
the EPA consulted with the DOE, and because Congress did not provide 
the DOE any further direction on how to prepare the study, the change in 
                                                                    
139
 Id.  
140
 Id. at 575. 
141
 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (9)(B)(ii) (2009)). 
142
 Id. at 575. 
143
 Id. 
144
 Id. 
145
 Id. 
146
 Id. at 576. 
147
 Id. 
148
 Id. at 577. 
149
 Id. 
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scoring was not arbitrary and capricious.150 Because the change was 
reasonably explained, the D.C. Circuit was unable to conclude a rulemaking 
process was necessary.151 The case was remanded but only for the limited 
purpose of further evaluation of a calculation error by the EPA.152 
2. Lion Oil Co. v. EPA 
A second case involving similar circumstances was Lion Oil Company 
v. EPA.153 This case was argued before the Eighth Circuit instead of the D.C. 
Circuit.154 Lion Oil is a small refinery in El Dorado, Arkansas.155 Like the 
previous case, the refinery received RFS program exemptions in 2012 and 
petitioned the EPA for additional exemptions in 2013.156 The EPA denied 
the petition.157 The EPA objected to this venue.158 
The EPA’s decision was made in a similar fashion to Hermes. The 
DOE was consulted, reviewed the refineries’ data, and applied that data to 
both the disproportionate impacts and viability indices.159 The DOE 
concluded that Lion Oil did not indicate a disproportionate economic 
hardship, as they did not score high enough on the viability index.160 Unlike 
Hermes, the EPA did not re-analyze either index, stating that they 
“evaluate[d] viability . . . in the same manner that the DOE considers 
viability in its own methodology.”161 
Like Hermes, Lion Oil argued that the change in the scoring structure 
of the indices was unlawful.162 The Eighth Circuit disagreed. Specifically, the 
EPA stated that the addition of an intermediate scoring system “more 
accurately characterize[s] the impacts of compliance costs . . .  or individual 
special events . . . on a refinery.”163 The Eighth Circuit pointed out: 
                                                                    
150
 Id.  
151
 Id.  
152
 Id. at 579. 
153
 Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2015). 
154
 Id. at 982. 
155
 Id. at 980. 
156
 Id. 
157
 Id. at 979. 
158
 Id. The EPA argued that the D.C. Circuit was the appropriate venue to bring this action 
because their decision had a nationwide scope. Id. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, pointing 
out that to have the effect of nationwide scope the EPA must publish their findings in denying 
the petition, not just provide them to the petitioner. Id. at 982. Because the EPA did not 
make their findings available to the public, the Eighth Circuit could hear the case. Id. 
159
 Id. at 980. 
160
 Id. 
161
 Id.  
162
 Id. at 983. 
163
 Id.  
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[An agency] need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the 
reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old 
one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, 
that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to 
be better, which the conscious change of course adequately 
indicates.164 
This means, just like in Hermes, that if a reasonable explanation is 
given, the agency can implement an adjusted policy. Lion Oil further argued 
that this change should have gone through a rule-making process.165 The 
Eighth Circuit disagreed, stating that the EPA conducted its decision from 
the direction of Congress by consulting with the DOE and considering the 
conclusions of the 2011 study.166 
Lion Oil also argued that the EPA’s use of viability within the 
interpretation of “disproportionate economic hardship” was 
unreasonable.167 Again, the Eighth Circuit applied Chevron deference and 
found ambiguity under Chevron step one, and a reasonable statutory 
interpretation under Chevron step two.168 Specifically, the Court of Appeals 
quoted Hermes when concluding that EPA’s interpretation was reasonable:  
[T]he relative costs of compliance alone cannot demonstrate 
economic hardship because all refineries face a direct cost 
associated with participation in the program. Of course, some 
refineries will face higher costs than others, but whether those costs 
impose disproportionate hardship on a given refinery presents a 
different question.169 EPA adopted DOE’s determination “that 
the best way to measure ‘hardship’ entailed examining the impact 
of compliance costs on a refinery’s ability to maintain profitability 
and competitiveness—i.e., viability—in the long term.”170 
                                                                    
164
 Id. (quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)). 
165
 Id. at 983–84. 
166
 Id. at 984. 
167
 Id. 
168
 See id. 
169
 Id. (quoting Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
170
 Id.  
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III. THE SINCLAIR DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedural Posture 
Sinclair’s two Wyoming refineries met the RFS program definition of 
“small refinery.”171 Thus, the refineries were exempt from the RFS statutory 
requirements until 2011.172 In addition, through the 2011 study, the DOE 
found that Sinclair’s refineries met the “disproportionate economic 
hardship” definition and extended its exemption to 2013.173  
Nearing the end of the exemption period, Sinclair petitioned the EPA 
to allow their small refineries to remain exempt.174 They argued that their 
business would continue to experience “disproportionate economic 
hardships” should the exemptions from the RFS program be lifted.175 The 
EPA consulted with the DOE, who recommended a partial exemption be 
granted to Sinclair.176 The EPA disagreed with the DOE’s approach and 
denied the petition after considering the aspects of the viability index as the 
agency had considered before.177 The EPA concluded that Sinclair’s 
refineries were capable of remaining profitable after covering the program 
costs.178 Sinclair filed a petition for review with the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.179 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Tenth Circuit 
granted the petition.180 
                                                                    
171
 Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 989 (10th Cir. 2017); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7545(o)(1)(K) (defining “small refinery” as “a refinery for which the average aggregate daily 
crude oil throughput for a calendar year (as determined by dividing the aggregate throughput 
for the calendar year by the number of days in the calendar year) does not exceed 75,000 
barrels.”). 
172
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 989–90. 
173
 Id. at 990. 
174
 Id. 
175
 Id. 
176
 Id. at 1002 (Lucero, J., dissenting). Contained within the Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 2016, Congress directed the DOE to adjust their recommendations when a refiner scoring 
matrix was greater than one for viability or structural impact categories. Id. Congress stated 
that the recommendation to the EPA should be a fifty percent waiver. Id. Judge Lucero 
pointed out that this direction came in an “explanatory statement” and did not amend § 
7545(o)(9). Id. (citing Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–113, 129 
Stat. 2242 (2015)). 
177
 Id. at 994. 
178
 Id. at 990. 
179
 Id.  
180
 Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (requiring courts to review agency actions and determine 
if final decisions were made within the scope of power granted by Congress). 
18
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B. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision 
The court of appeals first analyzed the issue of deference, as ultimately, 
the court’s final decision stemmed from its determination of this issue. Prior 
to making a final decision, both the EPA and Sinclair were afforded the 
opportunity to argue which type of deference, if any, should be applied. 
The EPA argued that Chevron deference should apply.181 The agency 
pointed to the ruling in Hermes and Lion Oil, indicating that the scenarios 
were on point with the case at hand.182 The EPA spelled out the facts of the 
case as they applied to deference determination. It argued:  
Chevron deference applies here because (1) Congress delegated 
authority to EPA to interpret the phrase “disproportionate 
economic hardship;” (2) other relevant factors identified by the 
Supreme Court weigh heavily in favor of affording Chevron 
deference in this context; and (3) EPA’s decisions carry the force 
of law and constitute precedent within the agency.183  
The analysis broke each of these points down. The first is a 
restatement of the direction Congress gave the EPA with respect to the RFS 
program.184 Under the second point, the EPA pointed out that this 
interpretation is an interstitial issue, or an issue which is a portion of a 
broader definition which Congress delegated to the agency to determine.185 
Because Congress required the EPA to administer and promulgate rules for 
the RFS program, creating a definition for “disproportionate economic 
hardship” was within the scope of their authority.186 The EPA also argued 
for further congressional authority because the determination to grant an 
exemption extension petition would affect the obligations a refinery needed 
to meet in subsequent years.187 Thus, according to the EPA, the decision 
carried the weight of law.188 
                                                                    
181
 Respondent’s Supplemental Brief on the Applicability of Chevron Deference at 5, Sinclair 
Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-9532) [hereinafter Resp’t’s 
Suppl. Br.]. Specifically citing Mead, the EPA noted Chevron applies “when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, 
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.” Id. (quoting U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)). 
182
 Id. at 7. 
183
 Id. 
184
 Id. at 8. 
185
 Id. at 9 (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 165 (2007)). 
186
 Id.; Resp’t’s Suppl. Br., supra note 181, at 9. 
187
 Id. at 11. 
188
 Id. 
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Sinclair disagreed and challenged the applicability of deference.189 The 
analysis focused on Edelman v. Lynchburg College, in which the Supreme 
Court held “there is no need to resolve deference issues when there is no 
need for deference.”190 Sinclair stated that there is no need to “settle on any 
degree of deference” to an agency’s statutory interpretation where that 
interpretation “is clearly wrong.”191 Specifically, Sinclair argued that the 
interpretation did not follow the plain meaning of the words 
“disproportionate economic hardship” and congressional intent.192 The 
analysis continued by rejecting both Chevron and Skidmore deference 
arguments. For Skidmore, Sinclair conceded that the court could grant a 
review of this type of deference but still asserted the interpretation would 
fail because it was not persuasive.193 Sinclair argued four points in opposing 
the application of Chevron.  
First, the record did not reflect that Congress gave authority to define 
“disproportionate economic hardship.”194 Congress authorized the EPA to 
promulgate rules for some of the RFS program but not for the “small 
refinery exemption provisions.”195 Sinclair claimed that the statute failed to 
provide guidance on how to define “disproportionate economic 
hardship.”196 Specifically, it did not address whether the EPA should change 
the meaning to an element involving a total refinery shut down.197 
Second, the EPA did not have a review process—one which included 
notice and comment periods—for Sinclair’s petition.198 A petition for an 
exemption extension was filed and denied without a review process.199 
Furthermore, while the review process requirements were known from past 
petition denials, there was no opportunity for comment by outside sources 
prior to the process being adopted.200 
Third, the head of the agency did not make this interpretation.  
Instead, a mid-level official made the denial.201 On this point, Sinclair 
                                                                    
189
 Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 9, Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 16-9532) [hereinafter Pet’r’s Suppl. Br.]. 
190
 Id. (quoting Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 n.8 (2002)). 
191
 Pet’r’s Suppl. Br., supra note 189, at 9. 
192
 Id.  
193
 Id. at 10 n.2. 
194
 Id. at 10. 
195
 Id.  
196
 Id. at 11. 
197
 Id.  
198
 Id. 
199
 Id. 
200
 Id. 
201
 Id. at 12. 
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appeared to be pointing to the final petition decision rather than the 
adoption of an interpretation. Their argument relied on Mead, claiming that 
the only appropriate time for Chevron to apply is when the head of an 
agency makes the ruling.202 
Fourth, the interpretation scenario did not reflect the requirements of 
Chevron deference.203 Sinclair stated that there are indicators an agency must 
satisfy to initiate the Chevron discussion. These include “the agency’s 
expertise, the importance of the question to the agency’s administration of 
the statute, and the degree of consideration the agency has given the 
question.”204 Sinclair argued that the EPA’s expertise lies in environmental 
matters but not in the “economic issues involved in operating a refinery or 
what may amount to ‘disproportionate economic hardship’ in the refinery 
business.”205 In addition, the small refinery exemption is a relatively 
insignificant portion of the EPA’s day to day requirements regulating the 
RFS program under the CAA.206 Finally, the record did not indicate that the 
EPA explored what Congress intended as the definition of 
“disproportionate economic hardship.”207 The EPA merely inserted its own 
meaning for the term.208 For these reasons, Sinclair contended that Chevron 
deference was not appropriate.  
In their decision, The Tenth Circuit determined that Skidmore 
deference was appropriate. The analysis relied on the guidance of Mead, 
where the Supreme Court determined classification rulings should carry the 
same weight as “interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 
manuals, and enforcement guidelines.”209 Mead determined that agency 
action “‘does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial 
deference otherwise its due,’ but rather, whether courts provide Chevron 
deference ‘depends in significant part upon the interpretive method used 
and the nature of the question at issue.’”210 Specifically, a court must analyze 
“the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the 
agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the 
                                                                    
202
 Id. at 13. 
203
 Id. 
204
 Id. at 13–14 (quoting WildEarth Guardians v. NPS, 703 F.3d 1178, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013)). 
205
 Pet’r’s Suppl. Br., supra note 189, at 14. 
206
 Id.  
207
 Id.  
208
 Id. Additionally, Sinclair points out that while the EPA did promulgate rules, the agency 
did not define the term “disproportionate economic hardship.” Id. at 10. 
209
 U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 
U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 
210
 Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 991 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Barnhart v. 
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221–22 (2002)). 
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complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the agency 
had given the question over a long period of time.”211 Put simply, the focal 
inquiry is whether the decision was created through a rulemaking process 
with the force of law or on a case-by-case analysis. 212 
The Tenth Circuit concluded that while Congress appointed the EPA 
to promulgate RFS program regulations, they did not do so for small 
refinery exemptions.213 Therefore, the EPA was not required to go through 
a rule-making process. Furthermore, because Sinclair submitted the 
application and the EPA’s decision was made without a notice and comment 
period or oral arguments, the exemption extension decision was not 
formally adjudicated.214 Finally, the decision does not have a precedential 
effect for other petitioners as each petition must be decided on a case-by-
case basis.215 
The Tenth Circuit, using Skidmore deference, concluded that the 
“EPA’s interpretation takes the statutory language too far.”216 Specifically, the 
EPA’s analysis misinterpreted the definition of hardship and ignored two 
metrics of the DOE’s three-factored test for measuring the viability index.217 
The Tenth Circuit noted that the EPA’s decision was primarily based on 
the long-term viability of the refinery.218 The interpretation shows that the 
EPA is interested solely in this effect, which is outside the scope of statutory 
authority.219 
The Tenth Circuit distinguished this case from Hermes and Lion Oil 
based on two factors. First, the D.C. and Eighth Circuits applied the wrong 
deference test.220 The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that Mead established 
Skidmore deference as the appropriate standard for “informal adjudication 
                                                                    
211
 Id. 
212
 Mead, 533 U.S. at 234. 
213
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d. at 992. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit did not mention 40 C.F.R. § 80 
1441(e)(2) in this analysis, and thus, the question of whether promulgating exemption 
extension rules fell within the EPA’s granted authority was never examined. 
214
 Id.  
215
 Id. The Court also discussed two more factors. Id. The first factor was that the head of the 
EPA did not make the decision; Chevron deference should be granted when an agency 
action was “formal and culminate[d] in a formal written decision by the head of the agency, 
not a nonbinding disposition by a low-level agency official.” Id. (quoting Groff v. U.S., 493 
F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The second factor was that viability analysis is a relatively 
new practice. Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 992. 
216
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 996. 
217
 Id. at 997. 
218
 Id. at 996.  
219
 Id.  
220
 Id. at 998. Both the D.C. and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Chevron deference 
instead of Skidmore deference. Id. 
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that ‘does not carry the force of law.’”221 Second, in Sinclair, the EPA’s 
determination was based on the long-term viability as the “necessary, if not 
the sole, factor.”222 The Tenth Circuit argued this determination 
distinguished the case because the EPA’s rejection was based on a single 
term, and the Hermes and Lion Oil cases were determined on the DOE’s 
multi-factor indices.223 As a result, the analysis agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision to vacate the EPA’s decision and remanded for further 
proceedings.224  
C. Judge Lucero’s Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Lucero made three arguments in his dissent. First, the majority’s 
analysis was flawed regarding the EPA’s determination of Sinclair’s 
petition.225 Second, there was no need to determine deference, as Congress 
was clear that petitions should be analyzed with the DOE’s input, the DOE’s 
2011 study, and any other economic factors.226 Third, Judge Lucero argued 
the majority tried to distinguish this case from Hermes and Lion Oil, but its 
analysis and comparison were inaccurate.227  
Judge Lucero pointed out that the EPA considered and used the 
DOE’s three-factor test in making its decision, which specifically included 
claims from Sinclair that fit under the special events metric (i.e. a onetime 
loss due to a fire in the refinery).228 Furthermore, the EPA invited the DOE’s 
opinion due to the DOE’s “expertise in evaluating economic conditions at 
U.S. refineries, which [the EPA] used in developing an assessment process 
for identifying when ‘disproportionate economic hardship’ exists in the 
context of the [RFS] program.”229 After the EPA received the DOE’s 
recommendation, they reviewed the data and applied the same indices the 
DOE employed.230 The EPA determined that the refinery scored a 1.6 on 
the compliance cost index and a zero on the viability index.231 In order to 
receive the exemption, a refinery must score greater than one in both 
categories.232 Judge Lucero noted the EPA went to great lengths in their 
                                                                    
221
 Id. 
222
 Id. at 999. 
223
 Id. 
224
 Id.  
225
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 999 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
226
 Id. at 1001. 
227
 Id. at 1002. 
228
 Id. at 1000. 
229
 Id. 
230
 Id.  
231
 Id.  
232
 Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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reasoning to explain what metrics were used to calculate this score. The 
dissenting opinion concluded that the only interpretation to take from that 
analysis was that a multi-factored—not a single factor—test was applied.233 
Judge Lucero’s second argument was that determining which 
deference standard to apply was unnecessary.234 Congress directed the EPA 
to use the DOE’s study when determining exemption petitions.235 Because 
the study outlined the basic test the EPA adopted, the agency did not exceed 
their statutory authority.236 The Supreme Court has held that in matters 
where a reasonable interpretation of the law exists, determining deference 
is unnecessary.237 Judge Lucero argued that the EPA’s interpretation to read 
into the refinery’s health was reasonable, as the agency considered both the 
DOE’s recommendation and the study’s findings.238 
Finally, Judge Lucero pointed out that Hermes and Lion Oil are cases 
in which two other circuits agreed with the approach adopted by the EPA. 
The majority erroneously focused on specific words within the EPA’s 
decision.239 The analysis led to a conclusion that the EPA was considering 
only one factor in the viability index, when in fact the agency was using the 
same factored tests used in Hermes and Lion Oil.240 The majority’s argument 
that this case was distinct from Hermes and Lion Oil cases relies on that 
conclusion, as well as the type of deference granted. Judge Lucero disagreed 
and pointed out that the majority’s conclusion was misguided.241 Judge 
Lucero supported the conclusions of Hermes and Lion Oil, holding this 
nuanced approach to the evaluation of exemption extension petitions was 
appropriate.242  
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Was Deference Applied Correctly? 
The first question to focus on when analyzing deference for the Sinclair 
case is what the court was trying to determine. Did the EPA exceed the 
statutory authority when adding an interpretation to the definition of 
                                                                    
233
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1001 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
234
 Id.; see also Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 n.8 (2002) (explaining “there is no 
need to resolve deference issues when there is no need for deference”). 
235
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1001 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
236
 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii). 
237
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1001 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (citing Edelman, 535 U.S. at 114). 
238
 Id. at 1002. 
239
 Id.  
240
 Id. 
241
 Id. 
242
 Id. at 1002–03. 
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“disproportionate economic hardship?” Determining which deference 
standard to apply is important as different types of deference carry different 
weights for the decision maker.243 Because Chevron deference is applied to 
interpretations with the force of law, it is regarded as carrying more weight 
within courts.244 As two other circuits, which both applied Chevron,245 came 
to alternate conclusions, it is possible that the type of deference applied 
impacts the outcome. 
 1. Arguments that Deference Should Not Apply 
The arguments made by Sinclair and Judge Lucero that no deference 
should apply are misguided. While Sinclair discussed at length why 
Chevron deference should not apply, their initial argument was because the 
EPA’s definition of “disproportionate economic hardship” includes a 
potential refinery shutdown, the agency has effectively created a term 
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.246 Sinclair used Edelman 
and General Dynamics to support their claim.247 However, the court in 
Edelman pointed out that determining deference is unnecessary when the 
rule or definition used is “not only a reasonable one but the position [the 
court] would adopt even if there were no formal rule and we were 
interpreting the statute from scratch.”248 In this context, Edelman would only 
apply where the court could completely agree with the agency’s 
interpretation. Thus, Sinclair pointed to General Dynamics, where the court 
explained that deference does not need to be determined when an agency’s 
interpretation is “clearly wrong.”249 However, two other circuit courts have 
ruled in favor of the EPA’s interpretation.250 Because other courts have ruled 
in an agency’s favor regarding the same issue, the argument that the EPA is 
“clearly wrong” loses weight. 
Sinclair also argued that the interpretation did not go through any 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal adjudication, or “relatively formal 
procedure.”251 However, that is not an accurate representation. Under the 
direction of § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i), the EPA promulgated regulations for the 
                                                                    
243
 Borgen, supra note 59, at 3. 
244
 Id. at 4.  
245
 Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 575 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 
792 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 2015). 
246
 Pet’r’s Suppl. Br., supra note 189, at 9. 
247
 See generally Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106 (2002); Gen. Dynamics Land 
Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004). 
248
 Edelman, 535 U.S. at 114. 
249
 Gen. Dynamics, U.S. 581 at 600. 
250
 See generally Hermes, 787 F.3d 568; Lion Oil, 792 F.3d 978. 
251
 Pet’r’s Suppl. Br., supra note 189, at 11. 
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RFS program.252 Those regulations are listed under 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441 and 
include a provision about exemption extension petitions.253 This regulation 
was not listed in the Hermes or Lion Oil cases, and the only party to 
mention § 80.1441(e)(2), interestingly enough, was Sinclair in their 
supplemental brief.254 The exemption extension program did go through a 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process.255 There is little direction 
provided to the regulated community with respect to what exactly the EPA 
will consider within a petition application. However, within the preamble to 
the Federal Register, where the rule was listed, the EPA specifically 
addressed that the decision-making process must consider the DOE’s 
economic impacts study.256 Sinclair was correct that the specific question as 
to the definition of “disproportionate economic hardship” was not raised 
during the promulgation of § 80.1441, but it was part of the DOE’s study 
which was discussed and commented on by the EPA and third parties.257 
                                                                    
252
 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2009). The regulation reads:  
  Not later than 1 year after August 8, 2005, the Administrator shall promulgate 
regulations to ensure that gasoline sold or introduced into commerce in the United 
States (except in noncontiguous States or territories), on an annual average basis, 
contains the applicable volume of renewable fuel determined in accordance with 
subparagraph (B). 
Id. 
253
 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441(e)(2) (2014). The regulation reads as follows: 
  A refiner may petition the Administrator for an extension of its small refinery 
exemption, based on disproportionate economic hardship, at any time. 
  (i) A petition for an extension of the small refinery exemption must specify the 
factors that demonstrate a disproportionate economic hardship and must provide 
a detailed discussion regarding the hardship the refinery would face in producing 
transportation fuel meeting the requirements of § 80.1405 and the date the refiner 
anticipates that compliance with the requirements can reasonably be achieved at 
the small refinery. 
  (ii) The Administrator shall act on such a petition not later than 90 days after the 
date of receipt of the petition. 
  (iii) In order to qualify for an extension of its small refinery exemption, a refinery 
must meet the definition of “small refinery” in § 80.1401 for the most recent full 
calendar year prior to seeking an extension and must be projected to meet the 
definition of “small refinery” in § 80.1401 for the year or years for which an 
exemption is sought. Failure to meet the definition of small refinery for any 
calendar year for which an exemption was granted would invalidate the exemption 
for that calendar year.  
Id. 
254
 Pet’r’s Suppl. Br., supra note 189, at 10. 
255
 Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670, 14,735–14,736 (Mar. 26, 
2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80). 
256
 Id. 
257
 Id.  
26
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Judge Lucero also argued that deference should not apply under 
Edelman.258 It is important to note that the argument used is the opposite 
argument made by Sinclair in their supplemental brief. Because Congress 
instructed the EPA to review exemption extension petitions while 
considering the DOE’s 2011 study, and because the definition of 
“disproportionate economic hardship” stemmed from that study, 
congressional intent is clear.259 Stated simply, because Congress directed the 
EPA to consider the study, and the study defined “disproportionate 
economic hardship,” the EPA did not exceed its authority. 
However, Judge Lucero’s point is too narrow to answer whether the 
direction from Congress was ambiguous. Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) provides 
clear direction: “In evaluating a petition under clause (i), the Administrator, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall consider the findings of 
the study under subparagraph (A)(ii) and other economic factors.”260 
However, ambiguity lies in whether authority was granted to adopt 
definitions laid out in the DOE’s 2011 study. Under Judge Lucero’s line of 
reasoning, the concept of why deference is given in the first place is 
overlooked. Deference is given when ambiguity exists within congressional 
direction.261 Because this case examines whether Congress intended the EPA 
to interpret what a “disproportionate economic hardship” means, some 
form of deference should be granted.  
2. Should Skidmore Deference be Applied? 
Next, the focus shifts to whether the definition, “disproportionate 
economic hardship,” should be granted Skidmore deference as the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applied to it in Sinclair. For Skidmore to apply, 
the agency must have made a statutory interpretation of “disproportionate 
economic hardship” without a legal requirement.262 Specifically, did 
Congress intend for the EPA to promulgate rules to create a definition? The 
Court of Appeals relied on Mead to determine that Chevron deference was 
not appropriate because any decision would not carry the force of law.263  
                                                                    
258
 Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 1001 (10th Cir. 2017) (Lucero, J., 
dissenting) (citing Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002) (“[T]here is no 
need to resolve deference issues when there is no need for deference.”)).  
259
 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii); Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1001 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
260
 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii). 
261
 Borgen, supra note 59, at 4. 
262
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 992-93. 
263
 Id. at 998.  
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In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit examined the four components264 for 
determining which type of deference to apply.265 The Tenth Circuit’s 
conclusion that Congress did not intend to grant the EPA authority to 
promulgate rules for the small refinery exemption extension is significant.266 
However, the fact that 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441267 exists was not discussed in the 
Tenth Circuit’s analysis. 
The EPA determined that the small refinery exemption program fell 
within the guidelines of § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i).268 As such, regulations were 
promulgated through a rulemaking process.269 As the court of appeals did 
not address constitutionality or make any mention of the regulation in its 
analysis, it is clear that when determining the deference standard, § 80.1441 
was not taken into consideration. Because a regulation was promulgated, 
the court of appeals can no longer conclude that the EPA is making 
interpretations like those “contained in policy statements, agency manuals, 
and enforcement guidelines.”270 Their analysis is incomplete, and thus, the 
conclusion to apply Skidmore deference over Chevron deference is 
misguided. 
                                                                    
264
 Id. at 991. The court of appeals quoted Skidmore directly, laying out “the weight courts 
provide an administrative judgment ‘will depend upon the thoroughness evident in [the 
agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.’” Id. (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
265
 The four points the court of appeals makes are as follows. First, Congress did not intend 
to grant the EPA authority to promulgate rules for the small refinery exemption. Id. at 992. 
As such, the review process was informal, and the definition of “disproportionate economic 
hardship” was not considered under a formal rulemaking process. Id. Second, the head of 
the EPA did not make the final decision. Id. (citing Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 
1352 (Fed. Cir 2007) (finding that for Chevron to apply the decision must be “formal and 
culminate[d] in a formal written decision by the head of the agency, not a nonbinding 
disposition by a low-level agency official.”)). Third, because the EPA did not publish the 
decision and make it available to third parties, it was not precedential and revealed that all 
decisions will be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. Finally, the disproportionate 
economic hardship analysis was relatively new. Id. 
266
 Id. 
267
 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441(e)(2) (2014) (promulgating regulations for the RFS 
Program). 
268
 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2009). 
269
 See generally Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670, 14,735–14,736 
(Mar. 26, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80). 
270
 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
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 3. Should Chevron Deference be Applied?  
As rules have been promulgated, any decision created would carry the 
force of law, which signifies Chevron deference could be appropriate.271 
However, for Chevron to apply, both prongs of the Chevron two-step must 
be met.272 Under Chevron step one, The question at issue is whether 
Congress gave clear directions as to the definition or how to determine a 
“disproportionate economic hardship.”273 Within the framework of § 
7545(o), Congress did not define the term and provided limited guidance 
for how the exemption program should be established.274  Thus, because the 
statute directs the EPA to create an exemption extension program but does 
not define the exact process in which it is to be conducted and Congress has 
not discussed the question at issue, Chevron step one is met.  
The reasonableness of the EPA’s interpretation of a “permissible 
construction of the statute” is Chevron step two.275 Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) 
directs the EPA to evaluate exemption extension petitions in consultation 
with the DOE and consider the DOE’s 2011 study in addition to any other 
economic factors. Congress did not provide additional direction. When a 
statute is silent with respect to all potentially relevant factors, it is eminently 
reasonable to conclude that silence is meant to convey “nothing more than 
a refusal to tie the agency’s hands.”276 Had Congress been more specific with 
their directions under the statute, potential unforeseen conflicts could have 
arisen once the DOE’s study concluded. As the D.C. Circuit pointed out in 
Hermes, incorporating the methodology from the 2011 study with a set 
viability index to determine whether a refinery experienced a 
“disproportionate economic hardship” was a reasonable interpretation of 
the statute.277 In fact, by keeping the same language as the 2011 study, the 
EPA created continuity in the decision-making process, which is well within 
the scope of the statute.278 Thus, Chevron step two is met, and the Tenth 
Circuit should have applied Chevron deference. 
Further, the court of appeal’s approach should have incorporated the 
guidelines set out in Barnhart, as the definition of interpretive rules were 
                                                                    
271
 Borgen, supra note 59, at 4. 
272
 Kemp, supra note 44. 
273
  Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
274
 Id. at 575. 
275
 See Kemp, supra note 44. 
276
 Monroe Energy, LLC v. EPA, 750 F.3d 909, 915 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
277
 Hermes, 787 F.3d at 575. 
278
 Id. 
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like the kind at issue in that case.279 The question is whether adopting the 
two-pronged test and the definition of “disproportionate economic 
hardship” laid out in the DOE’s 2011 study falls within congressional intent. 
As the statute clearly points out, the EPA should consider the findings of 
the study in developing their exemption extension program.280 Congressional 
intent is clear. Congress entrusted the EPA with this task as an expert 
agency, and any shortcomings in their expertise would be addressed through 
their required consultation with the DOE.281  
The only issue a Barnhart analysis would face is the length of time the 
EPA spent in deciding these cases. As the program was new, the agency had 
relatively few years of experience issuing decisions on these cases. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia pointed out that this time requirement is 
a relic of the pre-Chevron era.282 He stated that the time requirement should 
simply enforce the rationale for an outcome under the analysis.283 When 
considering the policy behind giving deference under Chevron, the time 
component seems to be a small point, one that focuses on how consistent 
an agency decision has been.284 While the EPA ruled on relatively few of 
these exemption extensions, their analysis has been consistent.285 The larger 
question of legislative intent is the more important aspect of the analysis and 
should be given greater weight.286 More specifically, Chevron should apply 
because Congress instructed the EPA to follow the 2011 study prior to the 
completion of the study, thus intending for the agency to make program 
interpretations.287  
                                                                    
279
 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 218 (2002) (holding that on review, the court must 
decide “(1) whether the statute unambiguously forbids [a given] interpretation, and if not, (2) 
whether the interpretation exceeds permissible bounds.”) (citing Chevron, Inc. v. NRDC, 
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). 
280
 Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 217. 
281
 See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii). 
282
 Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 226 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
283
 Id.  
284
 Brendan C. Selby, Internal Agency Review, Authoritativeness, and Mead, 37 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 539, 556 (2013). 
285
 See generally Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Lion Oil Co. 
v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2015). 
286
 Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 
ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 778 (2007) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 187, 218 (2006)). 
287
 See id. (noting that Mead shifted the court’s focus to intention and when “Congress intends 
courts to defer, courts should defer.”). 
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B. Interpretations of the EPA’s “Disproportionate Economic Hardship” 
 1. The D.C. and Eighth Circuit’s Interpretation 
In both the Hermes and Lion Oil cases, the EPA assessed 
“disproportionate economic hardships” using the DOE’s viability and 
disproportionate impacts indices.288 The Eighth Circuit held that the EPA 
followed the direction of Congress by consulting with the DOE and 
considering the 2011 study.289 The D.C. Circuit made the same conclusion, 
and the most important message to take away from Hermes is the following: 
DOE concluded, and EPA agreed, that the relative costs of 
compliance alone cannot demonstrate economic hardship because 
all refineries face a direct cost associated with participation in the 
program. Of course, some refineries will face higher costs than 
others, but whether those costs impose disproportionate hardship 
on a given refinery presents a different question. DOE determined 
that the best way to measure “hardship” entailed examining the 
impact of compliance costs on a refinery’s ability to maintain 
profitability and competitiveness—i.e., viability—in the long term. 
EPA adopted DOE’s understanding, and that choice [granted 
through Chevron deference] lies well within the agency’s 
discretion.290 
The requirements of the RFS program created costs for all refineries.291 
However, those costs will not affect each refinery in the same manner.292 The 
purpose of the exemption was to make sure those refineries having the most 
difficulty recovering from the associated costs (such as small refineries) 
would not fail and competition in the market would remain high.293 The 
exemption was not created for small refineries suffering from a minor 
hardship.294 The EPA and the DOE established a system in which a line was 
drawn to ensure that the refineries still needing the exemption would receive 
the relief sought.295 While the agency’s decisions were not published, the 
methodology was nonetheless consistent between petitions, a fact 
                                                                    
288
 Hermes, 787 F.3d at 573; Lion Oil, 792 F.3d at 980. 
289
 Lion Oil, 792 F.3d at 982. 
290
 Hermes, 787 F.3d at 575. 
291
 Id.  
292
 Id.  
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 Id.  
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 Id. 
295
 Id. at 574. 
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recognized between the D.C. and Eighth Circuit but not shared with the 
Tenth Circuit.296  
 2. The Tenth Circuit’s Interpretation 
The majority recognized the methods used by the EPA in the Sinclair 
case as being the same applied in Hermes and Lion Oil.297 However, the 
majority opinion focused on a very specific word in an unusual way. To 
analyze that process, it is important to evaluate the Tenth Circuit’s analysis. 
First, it discusses the EPA’s rationale for not following the DOE’s partial 
exemption recommendation:  
In the discussion that follows, EPA independently reviews the 
information as we consider other economic factors in our 
analysis, including, but not limited to, profitability, net income, 
cash flow and cash balances, gross and net refining margins, 
ability to pay for refinery improvement projects, corporate 
structure, debt and other financial obligations, RIN prices, and 
the cost of compliance through RIN purchases. After considering 
all of this information, EPA finds [the Sinclair, Wyoming 
refinery] will not experience “disproportionate economic 
hardship” from compliance with the RFS program. As an initial 
matter, EPA recognizes its decision differs from DOE’s 
recommendation. The CAA requires that EPA act on a small 
refinery’s petition “in consultation with” DOE, “consider[ing] the 
findings of” the DOE Small Refinery Study and “other economic 
factors.” EPA gives weight to DOE’s technical evaluation and 
scoring of the refinery, recognizing that DOE has more 
experience in assessing, e.g., the impact of a particular [sic] special 
event, and how to balance short-term events with longer term 
planning and concerns over viability. However, EPA has 
responsibility for making the ultimate decision after considering 
DOE’s evaluation and recommendation, and continues to 
believe that the proper interpretation of the statutory 
prerequisite—disproportionate economic hardship—involves 
“examining the impact of compliance costs on a refinery’s ability 
to maintain profitability and competitiveness—i.e. viability—in the 
long term.”298 
                                                                    
296
 See generally Hermes, 787 F.3d 568; Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the EPA must consider the DOE study, review other economic factors, and 
engage in the DOE consultation when evaluating refinery petitions for exemption 
extensions). 
297
 Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 998 (10th Cir. 2017). 
298
 Id. at 995 (quoting J.A. Vol. 1 at 17–18 (quoting 32 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii) and, in the 
last sentence, Hermes, 787 F.3d at 575) (emphasis added)). 
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The Tenth Circuit used this rationale to conclude that the EPA is only 
considering whether a refinery will face a closure if an exemption extension 
is not granted.299 Next, the majority opinion used the following excerpt from 
the EPA’s decision to clarify their point: 
EPA does not doubt that Sinclair incurred costs, both planned 
and unplanned, which affected profitability. However, as 
discussed above, EPA believes that it is necessary to show that 
RFS compliance will have an impact on the refinery’s ongoing 
future viability to be eligible for an exemption. After considering 
the full financial picture of [the Sinclair refinery] for 2014 and 
prior years, EPA does not find that compliance with RFS for 2014 
would threaten [the Sinclair refinery]’s viability. Given [the 
Sinclair refinery]’s situation, we do not believe that an RFS 
exemption for [the Sinclair refinery] is justified under the 
statutory requirement of a disproportionate economic hardship.300 
From that excerpt, the majority’s opinion focuses on the word 
“necessary”.301 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit claimed that because the EPA 
used this word, they were no longer considering all three metrics of the 
viability index laid out in the DOE’s 2011 study.302 However, this argument 
is a very narrow interpretation of the word “necessary.” To say that the EPA 
is only considering long-term effects does not fall in line with the rationale 
laid out in the agency’s explanation.303 In consideration of the first two 
metrics (compliance costs and special events), the EPA argues that it is 
“necessary” to also consider the third metric of the viability index: long-term 
effects.304 Such a consideration must not be interpreted to mean that long-
term viability is the only factor being considered.305 The EPA is simply 
showing that while a refinery may have costs associated with compliance or 
special events, it also needs to show that those costs will have a long-standing 
impact that could result in a shutdown, although a potential shutdown is not 
necessary.306 In effect, one needs to show that the cost of compliance will 
have a disproportionate economic hardship and place the future of the 
                                                                    
299
 Id. (citing J.A. Vol. 1. at 19–20). 
300
 Id. at 996. (citing J.A. Vol. 1 at 20–21 (emphasis added)). 
301
 Id.  
302
 Id. 
303
 Id. at 1001 n.2 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (citing Resp’t’s. Suppl. Br., supra note 181, at 38–
39). 
304
 Id. at 996. (citing J.A. Vol. 1 at 20–21). 
305
 Id. at 1001 n.2 (Lucero, J., dissenting). “The viability factor addresses 
three types of metrics that could impact long-term competitiveness, none of which necessarily 
would cause a closure of the facility in the near term . . . .” Id. (citing Resp’t’s. Suppl. Br., 
supra note 181, at 38–39). 
306
 Id. 
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refinery at risk.307 Without this showing, the bar for the viability index would 
be low, and an exemption could be easily granted to any small refinery 
(assuming they score greater than one on the impacts index), which is not 
the purpose of the exemption. The exemption’s purpose is to mitigate the 
impacts of the program and maintain strong competition.308 
In his dissent, Judge Lucero points out the inaccuracy of the majority’s 
claim.309 The dissent’s argument comes down to this point: if the EPA 
intended to focus only on long-term viability, why mention the other 
measurable impacts at all?310 The EPA spends a lot of time discussing the 
two indices and the process in which they determine whether an exemption 
extension should be granted.311 Judge Lucero argues that had the majority 
paid attention to those comments, their conclusion would reflect 
consideration consistent with previous decisions of the three factors of the 
viability index approach.312 Specifically, the EPA stated that an indication that 
the cost of compliance or a special event creates “an inability to increase 
efficiency to remain competitive” in the long term is all that is necessary to 
meet the requirements of the index.313 An impending closure is not required 
to score high enough on the viability index.314 
Interestingly, the majority does address Judge Lucero’s point.315 They 
state that their review of the arguments does not take the EPA’s comments 
in isolation and that the process employed is taken wholly into 
consideration.316 However, their conclusion is inconsistent with this 
statement. Judge Lucero is correct in his assertion that had the majority 
considered the EPA’s process in its entirety, they would have concluded that 
this nuanced approach has a multiple-step requirement. In addition, had 
the majority seen this approach, their conclusion would have been 
consistent with the conclusions discussed in both the Hermes and Lion Oil 
cases.317 
                                                                    
307
 See Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA., 787 F.3d 568, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing J.A. 59). 
The exemption was meant to allow refineries to continue to invest in efficiency 
improvements. Without improvements a small refinery may not be able to compete, the 
result of which could be a future shutdown. Id.  
308
 Id.  
309
 Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986, 1001 (10th Cir. 2017) (Lucero, J., 
dissenting). 
310
 Id. at 1000 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
311
 Id.  
312
 Id.  
313
 Id. at 1001 n.2 (citing Resp’t’s. Suppl. Br., supra note 181, at 38–40).  
314
 Id. 
315
 Id. at 995 n.5. 
316
 Id. 
317
 Id. at 1002 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
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C. Outcome of the Case 
While the arguments of this case are narrow, Sinclair still should have 
prevailed but for several different reasons. The court of appeals applied the 
wrong form of deference, and their interpretation of the EPA’s reviewal 
process was narrow and misguided. However, Sinclair could have won for 
the procedural reason under 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441(e)(2)(ii), which requires 
that the EPA administrator is required to act on exemption extension 
provisions.318 Both Sinclair and the court of appeals discussed, a mid-level 
EPA agent made the decision,319 which is a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 
80.1441(e)(2)(ii). However, the result of Sinclair prevailing would simply 
have the case remanded to the EPA administrator's review pursuant to the 
regulation standard. 
Upon remand, the result should be consistent with Hermes and Lion 
Oil. The standard set in place upon the direction of the DOE’s 2011 study 
was determined a reasonable interpretation of the authority granted to the 
EPA by Congress.320 As the EPA did not deviate from that standard, the 
Tenth Circuit should have had a conclusion consistent with the D.C. and 
Eighth Circuits. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Within the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress directed the EPA to 
promulgate rules to create a Renewable Fuel Standards program.321 Within 
that program, Congress delegated authority to the EPA to create an 
exemption extension program.322 Specifically, exemptions would be 
reviewed after consultation with the DOE and careful consideration of the 
DOE’s 2011 study and other economic factors.323 The EPA promulgated 
rules for the RFS program through a rulemaking process, including rules 
for the exemption extension program.324 
Following the guidelines set in the DOE’s 2011 study, the EPA 
adopted a two-prong test to determine if a refinery met the requirements for 
                                                                    
318
 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441(e)(2)(ii) (2014) (“The Administrator shall act on such a petition not 
later than 90 days after the date of receipt of the petition.”). 
319
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 992; Pet’r’s Suppl. Br., supra note 189, at 7–8. 
320
 See generally Hermes Consol., LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Lion Oil Co. 
v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2015) (both holding the EPA interpretation of 
“disproportionate economic hardship” reasonable). 
321
 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, supra note 88.  
322
 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2009); see also id. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii). 
323
 Id. at § 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii). 
324
 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441 (2014). 
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an exemption due to “disproportionate economic hardship.”325 Those 
prongs include a disproportionate impacts index and a viability index.326 In 
order to qualify for an exemption, a refinery would need to score above one 
on each of the indices.327 
The D.C. Circuit in Hermes and the Eighth Circuit in Lion Oil both 
reviewed the EPA’s exemption program and came to similar conclusions. 
Both granted Chevron deference regarding the question of whether the 
term “disproportionate economic hardship” was defined correctly within 
the scope of power granted to the EPA.328 Both concluded that the 
interpretation was reasonable and affirmed the decision. 
When presented with a similar case, however, the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals came to a different conclusion.329 Using Mead, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that Chevron deference was not appropriate and applied 
Skidmore deference.330 However, the court failed to consider 40 C.F.R. § 
80.1441. Because the EPA subjected the exemption extension program to 
a rulemaking process, the court of appeals should have applied Chevron 
deference. Furthermore, using a Barnhart analysis, Chevron should apply 
because the adoption of the two-pronged test fell within the agency’s 
interpretive authority. The decision was based on a rule granted through 
congressional authority.331 As the D.C. and Eighth Circuits pointed out, that 
standard is a reasonable interpretation.332 
Judge Lucero’s dissent as to the majority’s focus on the word necessary 
was accurate.333 The majority opinion applied a narrow review of the EPA’s 
standard.334 By focusing on insignificant words, the Tenth Circuit 
inaccurately applied the facts and thus misinterpreted the extension 
exemption reviewal process. The EPA applied a process in which both 
                                                                    
325
 Hermes, 787 F.3d at 573; see also Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1000 (Lucero, J., dissenting). Eight 
metrics are measured under “disproportional structural impacts”: “percentage of diesel 
production, access to capital/credit, availability of other cash flows, local market, state 
regulation, relative refining margin, blending capability, and niche market.” Three metrics 
are measured under “viability”: “whether compliance costs ‘would reduce the profitability of 
the firm enough to impair future efficiency improvements’; ‘[r]efinery specific events . . . in 
the recent past that have a temporary negative impact on the ability of the refinery to comply’; 
and whether compliance costs are ‘likely to lead to shut down.’” Id. 
326
 Hermes, 787 F.3d at 573. 
327
 Id. 
328
 Id. at 575; Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 2015).  
329
 Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 992. 
330
 Id.  
331
 Borgen, supra note 59, at 4. 
332
 Hermes, 787 F.3d at 575; Lion Oil, 792 F.3d at 984. 
333
 See Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 1001 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
334
 See id. 
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indices were required to meet a certain score.335 Within the viability index, it 
is necessary to consider the long-term impacts of the program on the 
refinery’s ability to compete and not necessarily on whether the refinery will 
shut down.336 Had the court of appeals considered the EPA’s comments on 
the matter, their conclusion would have been similar to other circuit 
decisions.337  
While Sinclair still should have won on a procedural technicality, the 
overall result should have been in favor of the EPA’s decision. The point of 
the RFS exemption program is to provide some relief to small refineries. 
The idea is to level the playing field and foster competition. The program 
is designed to assist facilities that face an inability to compete in the market, 
which could lead to a closure due to a “disproportionate economic 
hardship” caused by the RFS program. It is not a means to grant relief for 
any hardship, only those which have dire consequences and will harm 
market competition in the long run.  
                                                                    
335
 Id.  
336
 Id. 
337
 Hermes, 787 F.3d at 575; Lion Oil, 792 F.3d at 984.
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